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Abstract
In Mexico City, over 500,000 people are estimated to earn a living working as street vendors. In recent years 
Mexican street commerce has been increasingly criminalized in the context of “revanchist” neoliberal urban 
politics which have aimed to “reclaim” and gentrify urban spaces, mirroring a global trend (Leal Martinez 2016, 
Swanson 2007, Janoschka et al. 2013). Yet the law structures the social lives of street vendors not only in its 
repressive, revanchist capacity, but through more subtle and quotidian forms of legal disregulation (Goldstein 
2015). My goal in this paper, accordingly, is to make sense of the role of legality in shaping the forms of 
symbolic and affective labor in which street vendors engage beyond those areas which are explicitly targeted by 
neoliberal urban development schemes. To that end, I propose a framework of “ambiguous legalities” as a way 
to understand the relationship between law and the everyday production of street vending. Paying attention to 
ambiguous legalities means looking at the ways not only that legal uncertainties are created and maintained, 
but on the way in which they influence forms of everyday comportment and the invisible labor of symbolic 
boundary-work (Lamont 1992). Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Mexico City’s central wholesale market, I 
illustrate the ways in which ambiguous legality is produced through the legal technology of the vending permit, 
and describe how street vendors and other social actors attempt to make moral-legal claims through a process 
I refer to as “disambiguation.” Finally, I discuss how popular discourses about state illegitimacy and corruption 
contribute to legal ambiguities, and the challenges that they pose to street vendors in their efforts to combat 
popular perceptions of criminality and illegality.
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Disambiguating Legalities:
Street vending, law, and boundary-work in Mexico City
Introduction
In Mexico City, over 500,000 people are estimated to earn a living working 
as street vendors. Ambulantes, as they are popularly known, sell a wide vari-
ety of products – ranging from cell phones, watches, clothing, and batteries 
to industrial snacks and prepared street foods – and represent an important 
source of affordable consumer goods for the city’s hyper-mobile, working 
populations. In spite of their symbolic and material importance in Mexico 
City, street vendors are controversial figures who are frequently described 
through the trope of illegality. In recent years, like elsewhere in the world, 
Mexican street commerce has been increasingly criminalized in the context 
of “revanchist” neoliberal urban politics which have aimed to “reclaim” and 
gentrify urban spaces (Leal Martinez 2016, Swanson 2007, Janoschka et al. 
2013). Much contemporary scholarship has focused on these waves of crimi-
nalization and repression, drawing attention to the strategies of legal and 
political resistance and negotiation to which vendors turn in such contexts 
(Cross 1998, Crossa 2009, 2015, Meneses-Reyes 2013, Stamm 2007).
Yet most street vending in Mexico lies outside of the reach of such large-
scale removal projects, which are largely limited to the Centro Histórico and 
a few upper-middle class enclaves. For the most part, ambulantaje is char-
acterized by more subtle and quotidian forms of legal, political, and social 
negotiation and routine. My goal in this paper, accordingly, is to make sense 
of the role of legality in shaping the forms of symbolic and affective labor in 
which street vendors engage beyond those areas which are explicitly targeted 
by neoliberal urban development schemes. In doing so, my goal is not to di-
minish the significance of repression and criminalization in the context of 
neoliberal urbanism, but to expand the analysis of law’s symbolic and mate-
rial effects in contemporary Mexico City more broadly, and to consider the 
forms of invisible labor and inequalities which they produce.
To that end, I propose analyzing street vending in Mexico as a form of 
what I call “ambiguous legality.” Ambiguous legality is a term that can be 
used to describe fields of social practice – in this case, street vending – for 
which uncertainty and disagreement over legality are among its constitutive 
characteristics. Ambiguous legalities have four basic qualities: 1) There is a 
lack of consensus about the source and legitimacy of authorities who could 
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define their formal legal status; 2) They are subject to frequent, significant 
changes to formal legal regulation governing their practice; 3) They are a 
heterogeneous legal field grounded in a homogeneous social imaginary; 4) 
They compel actors to engage in “disambiguation,” that is, forms of symbolic 
and affective boundary-work.
The concept of ambiguous legality – especially its first and second char-
acteristics – draws on recent theories of informality, most notably Ananya 
Roy’s (2009) account of “deregulation” as a condition of what she calls the 
“informalized state.” Deregulation refers to the partial, incomplete forms of 
state regulation of particular spaces and activities, which produces legal am-
biguity and confusion, with the law appearing “open-ended and subject to 
multiple interpretations and interests.” While deregulation refers to a pro-
cess, however, ambiguous legalities are social fields of practice within which 
people work on doing particular things, such as selling tacos or sex on the 
streets, or washing dishes in a restaurant. Paying attention to ambiguous le-
galities means looking at the ways not only that legal uncertainties are creat-
ed and maintained, but on the way in which they influence forms of everyday 
comportment and the invisible labor of symbolic boundary-work (Lamont 
1992).
In this paper, I draw on fieldwork conducted among street vendors and 
wholesale food merchants in Mexico City in 2012, and 2014-2015. I focus, 
in particular, on a series of debates over a permitting program in the whole-
sale market area of Mexico City, and which produced cleavages and social 
disagreements rather than legal clarity or legibility. My paper is structured 
as follows: in the first section, I briefly outline the way in which the relation-
ship between legality and street vending has been theorized and popularly 
imagined in Mexico, arguing that insufficient attention has been paid to the 
heterogeneous types of formal legality and interpretations which comprise 
the field of street vending. In the second section, I turn to an extended eth-
nographic example to illustrate the ways in which ambiguous legality is pro-
duced through the legal technology of the vending permit, situated in the 
context of existing understandings of street vending as criminality, and cor-
ruption. In the third section, I describe how street vendors and other so-
cial actors attempt to make moral-legal claims through a process I refer to 
as “disambiguation.” In the final section, I discuss how popular discourses 
about state illegitimacy and corruption contribute to legal ambiguities, and 
the challenges that they pose to street vendors in their efforts to combat pop-
ular perceptions of criminality and illegality.
Visualizing Legal Heterogeneity
Street vending has been associated with illegality and disorder in Mexico 
City to varying degrees since at least the nineteenth century, when modern-
17
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izing regimes introduced municipal regulations aimed at eliminating what 
elites saw as its unsightly and unhygienic presence from the street (Agos-
toni 2003, Barbosa Cruz 2010). Concerns about diseases, miasmas, and un-
ruly crowds animated the efforts of early modernizers in Mexico to restrict 
street commerce in the nation’s capital. After the revolution in 1910-20 and 
throughout much of the twentieth century, street vendors grew in number 
and political power, fueled by waves of rural migration to the city as well as 
clientelistic arrangements with the ruling PRI party (Partido Revoluciona-
rio Institucional) through which vendors’ associations were able to secure 
large swaths of land for their members to work (Cross 1998; Monnet 2005). 
Even in the midst of these successful forms of political appropriation on the 
part of vendors’ associations, however, city leaders periodically attempted to 
remove vendors from specific parts of the city, pointing out that they were 
there illegally and smearing them in state-controlled media. With the onset 
of neoliberalism and democratization in Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
number of street vendors increased markedly, but so too did heightened fears 
of criminal disorder and globally circulating discourses of corruption and 
transparency (Becker and Müller 2013; Leal Martinez 2016).
Vendors, consequently, came to be associated with illegality in Mexi-
co both as a result of violating specific municipal laws, and because of their 
clientelistic arrangements with the state that got glossed as “corruption” by 
middle-class critics (who themselves conveniently elided their own forms 
of state appropriation in the process). Newspaper headlines accusing street 
vendors of being “mafias,” trafficking in illegal goods, engaging in corrup-
tion, and being disorderly are now daily features in Mexico (Aguiar 2013; 
Leal Martinez 2016; Hayden 2014). Alejandra Leal Martinez (2016) has ar-
gued that in a context of “actually existing neoliberalism” in Mexico, elites 
and middle classes view street vendors as representing irredeemable forms 
of illegality and criminality, as well as outmoded and illegitimate forms of 
politics. One of her interviewees, a man named Armando, pithily articulates 
the widespread elitist sentiment that street vendors are pathological: “They 
are also a cancer for the center, because they make noise and they don’t re-
spect the law.” He goes on to explain to her the compromised moral and po-
litical status of vendors:
“It is disrespectful to those trying to do things right, those who 
pay taxes, those who want to contribute to society, to the histori-
cal center, to build a better society. And it is a bit like Mexican 
crookedness, you know, like, ‘not me’, right? ‘I take my own path 
and I do whatever I want’. To me it is like dishonest competition, 
it is opportunistic.” (Armando, Interview with Leal Martinez, 
September 27, 2006)
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On the one hand, this popular association of street vending with illegality 
appears not to be unfounded: There are indeed multiple laws prohibiting the 
use of public thoroughfares in Mexico City for commercial purposes, includ-
ing the Reglamento de comercio semifijo y ambulante (1930), Reglamento 
de Mercados (1951), and Ley de Cultura Cívica (2004), among others. Be-
yond overt legislative attempts to limit street vending, moreover, the cur-
rent Mexico City government, led by mayor Miguel Angel Mancera, is in the 
process of attempting to “reorganize” street vendors, with the idea of limiting 
their numbers, by using “smart city” technologies, like geolocated vending 
permits. Such “soft” technologies act as forms of biopolitical regulation, in 
tandem with “hard” forms of repression and violence against newly criminal-
ized vendors.1
Yet street vending is hardly an undifferentiated realm of illegality. There 
are tens of thousands of permitted ambulantes in Mexico City, ranging from 
specially recognized groups of disabled and blind vendors organized into 
unions, to individual applicants (Meneses-Reyes 2013; Serna Luna 2013). 
Vending permitting systems, moreover, are the consequence not only of ne-
gotiations, protests and mobilizations by what Chatterjee (2004) calls “politi-
cal society,” but also of actions in the realm of “civil society,” in court battles 
fought by associations of ambulantes over the years (Azuela and Meneses 
2012). Indeed, in numerous cases over the years, the courts have ruled that 
street vendors have a constitutionally guaranteed right to work, enshrined in 
Article 5 of the Mexican constitution2, even as they have permitted cities to 
restrict vending in certain areas (ibid). In 2016, reforms of the Mexico City 
constitution included, in article 15, recognition of street vendors as “non-
salaried workers,” and guaranteeing certain rights as a result. For as long as 
there have been prohibitions placed on street vending, in other words, there 
have also been categories of legality built in the form of permitting systems 
and legal recognition at various levels of the state.
Yet these differences and implications of formal legal status have gone 
largely unnoticed by scholars interested in street vending, who have largely 
replicated homogenizing discourses about street vendors as “informal” and 
“illegal”, even as they have provided critical insights into the dynamics of 
urban exclusion and resistance. In a recent article, Crossa (2016) notes that 
street vendors are too often approached as an undifferentiated collectivity, 
and argues for the need to de-homogenize them in order to better under-
stand the nature of urban informality. Her analysis, however, largely focuses 
on organizational, class, and discursive modes of differentiation, and is less 
1 See Goldstein and Alonso-Bejarano 2017 for a similar argument in relation to 
undocumented migrants and “smart” technologies in the United States. 
2 Mexico’s 1917 Constitution, drafted after the Revolution, is famous for being 
progressive, restricting the power of the Catholic church, and enshrining a 
number of social rights, including the right to work in any occupation so long 
as it does not infringe on the rights of others.
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attentive to the role of formal legality in contributing to the heterogeneity of 
street vendors. In notable exception, Meneses-Reyes (2013) has drawn atten-
tion to the existence of permitted and unpermitted vendors in Mexico City, 
arguing that their shared presence in the downtown represents a “dual-legal 
geography,” in which vendors may work from the same area, but experience 
space and movement in different ways. Important though this insight is, 
however, it leaves little sense of how the more broadly circulating popular 
discourses of illegality intersect with more complex, heterogeneous forms of 
legality within street vending, and how people negotiate the space between 
these two. As I will later argue, “disambiguation,” a form of boundary work, 
becomes central to the everyday labor of street vending in this context. To 
illustrate how legal ambiguity is produced through deregulation, I turn to 
an ethnographic account of debates over a street vending program in Mexico 
City’s wholesale market area, La Central de Abasto (CEDA).
Permitting Ambiguous Legality
Lupe is a street vendor, a cafetera, who sells hot coffee, sweetbreads, and 
atole out of a shopping cart in the wee hours of the morning in the CEDA. 
To get there in time for the morning rush, Lupe gets up before 3 o’clock am 
every day to start brewing coffee and boiling sugary water which she thickens 
with cornmeal to make the hot morning beverage, atole. By 3:30, she loads 
her grocery cart with the beverages, styrofoam cups, napkins, and thin plas-
tic bags. With her oldest son, who helps her in the mornings before going to 
the university, she walks for 45 minutes down darkened streets to get to the 
market, stopping at a bakery along the way to pick up several bags of rolls 
and pan dulce.
Once there, Lupe goes to the same corner she has worked on for the last 
seven years. Leaving her son in charge of the cart, she goes around her sector, 
taking orders for coffee, flashing a broad smile here and there, greeting ev-
eryone in sight. Although most people only know her by her first name, Lupe 
is intimately acquainted with her neighbors, and on excellent terms with the 
local police, inspectors, and merchants alike. These good relations, Lupe is 
quick to make clear, are a consequence of, rather than a substitute for, legal-
ity. She always has prominently displayed a crisp, laminated vending permit, 
which demonstrates that she is an ambulante legal, a legal street vendor. 
There are others, she explains, who are there illegally, who don’t have per-
mits. Those ones are a problem, and the authorities need to remove them in 
order to prevent the market from getting too crowded.
Wholesale merchants are quick to point out that street commerce is pro-
hibited by the municipal and market codes. Leopold, an aging wholesaler 
and member of the merchant’s association UNCOFYL, is emphatic in his dis-
agreement with Lupe on the subject of ambulantes: “There’s no such thing 
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as a legal informal (informal vendor). The only thing that permit tells us is 
that the authorities are colluded, and that [the vendors] are here thanks to 
the cancer of corruption from which we suffer in this country.” Even as he 
buys his morning coffee and newspapers from ambulantes, Leopold rejects 
Lupe’s attempt to differentiate between legal and illegal street vendors, in-
stead lumping all of them into the latter category, which he sees as a signifier 
of a rotten political system.
In spite of Leopold’s assertions to the contrary, the wholesale market 
allows for some legal street vending. Through its Office of Regulatory Com-
pliance (Normatividad), the market’s administration issues 2,881 permits 
to members of thirty vendors’ associations, under an agreement reached be-
tween vendors’ unions and the former administration in 2005. The demand 
for permits far exceeds these numbers, however, since there are estimated to 
be well over 5,000 vendors in the market itself, leading to the situation de-
scribed by Lupe, where some vendors are licensed and other are not. Instead 
of resolving disputes over street vending, therefore, permits themselves gen-
erally become the source of new “fields of illegal practice”, in the form of 
unregulated vendors whose numbers always exceed the changing limits of 
permitting regimes (Foucault 1995: 280). More problematically, still, from 
the perspective of those, like Lupe, who hope to be exempted from the stigma 
of illegality, the legitimacy of licensing programs is itself frequently called 
into question by formal merchants and opponents of street vending. Yet it is 
not only the lack of information about the “truth” of Lupe’s legality, or a case 
of differing perspectives which account for her disagreement with Leopold. 
The permit itself, as a legal technology, contains within it multiple forms of 
ambiguity and contingency, both temporal and spatial.
The permit which Lupe displays is a busy, color-printed document em-
bossed with all of the trappings of officialdom. It has the logo of the CEDA, 
the market director’s signature, a barcode, a ten digit identification number, 
expiration date, and various identifying details about Lupe, including her 
photo, full name, product she sells, and hours during which she is permit-
ted to work. Conspicuously absent from the permit, however, is any specific 
information about where Lupe is permitted to hawk her wares. Instead, in 
the lower righthand side of the document, it says Ambulatory Vendor (“co-
merciante en andadores”), despite the fact that Lupe stations herself in the 
same place every day.
Permits, however, never specify the place from which street vending 
can occur, since such specification would go against regulations prohibiting 
the use of public space for commerce. Instead, the workspace is constructed 
through regulating the bodily comportment of vendors, and by placing limits 
on the times during which they can work (Meneses-Reyes 2013). This does 
not mean, however, that access to specific places is random or unstable, but 
rather that allocation and access is delegated to the vendors’ unions, who ap-
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ply non-standardized and unwritten criteria. These criteria are often based 
on seniority, and on the individual leaders’ personal relationships with ven-
dors in their base. In practice, then, vendors tend to have a significant amount 
of spatial stability granted through the union. 
Fig. 1: Lupe’s vending permit. Photo: Tiana Bakić Hayden
The lack of specific spatial guidelines in the vendors’ permits leads to these 
becoming objects which produce spatial uncertainty in two ways. First, by 
creating a disemplaced “workplace,” it allows for the abstract right to work 
enshrined in article 4 of the Mexican Constitution to be protected, without 
explicitly violating local restrictions on street commerce (Meneses-Reyes 
2013). As permits offer no right to work in a particular place, however, they 
are useless as legal claims when spatialized conflicts do emerge, as vendors 
learned the hard way when their permits are summarily rescinded once cer-
tain desirable areas of the city are suddenly proclaimed off-limits to them 
(Crossa 2016; Stamm 2007; Azuela and Meneses 2012).
Secondly and relatedly, the vending license does not place explicit lim-
its on the distribution or density of street vending in a given area, leaving 
these sorts of determinations to the discretion of local inspectors, police, and 
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vendors’ leaders. What this means is that when there are territorial disputes 
between street vendors and merchants, or among vendors, even where all 
parties are fully licensed, there is no legal ground for staking a claim to a 
particular location.
Although working hours are clearly stated on the vending permit, these 
documents nevertheless become objects of temporal uncertainty and disac-
cord. Permits are the result of political agreements between authorities and 
vendors’ unions, and wholesale attempts to remove vendors or cancel permit-
ting agreements are likely to be met with violence and overt resistance. One 
of the strategies that the current administration has been using, accordingly, 
is to change the temporality of licensing itself, requiring permits to be more 
frequently renewed and less durable. In a 2015 meeting with members of 
UNCOFYL, the merchants’ association, a representative detailed the admin-
istration’s strategy to move forward with the “reorganization” of ambulantes, 
a city-wide initiative that aims to reduce their numbers. Previously, the per-
mits issued to the 2,881 vendors covered in the 2005 agreement had an in-
definite duration, but Normatividad has reduced their period of validity first 
to one year, then to six months. The idea, he explained, is to make it more 
difficult for merchants to renew these permits, and to ensure that those who 
don’t comply with hygienic and spatial regulations cannot renew. Not only 
will no new vendors be permitted, but some of those already grandfathered 
in will be stripped of their documentation.
The rapidly shifting, partially documented, and incomplete forms of le-
gal regulation of street vending in the CEDA are productive of a field of am-
biguous legality. Within this field, where legal status and the very legitimacy 
and meaning of the law itself are questionable, the work of disambiguation 
becomes an important daily event.
Disambiguation
Disambiguation refers to the process by which subjects who are interpellated 
by ambiguous legality work to clarify legal categories in order to assert the 
morality of their own position. It is a form of boundary-work that entails 
drawing symbolic boundaries between oneself and others, and interpreting 
difference as a means of defining identity. In her seminal study of boundary-
work, Michele Lamont (1992) looks at the construction of working class male 
identities, and how they use religion, work ethic, and emotion as means of 
constructing racialized moral boundaries against “immoral” men. In sepa-
rate studies of Latin migrants in the United States, Susan Coutin (2000) and 
Nicholas DeGenova (2005) find migrants engaged in a constant struggle to 
demonstrate their “deservingness,” often in moral terms, and against other 
“less deserving” migrants and US citizens, especially Blacks. In the context 
of street vendors’ legal ambiguity in Mexico, disambiguation serves to both 
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bolster the moral identity of those who are associated with illegality, either 
by recourse to claims of legality, or by questioning the legitimacy of existing 
boundaries of legality.
In the case of the debate over vending permits in the CEDA, discussed 
above, disambiguation takes on a particular, temporally defined form. Vend-
ing permits are products of particular moments in time, of agreements 
reached and conditions negotiated. To accept a permit as legitimate means 
accepting the legitimacy of the authority emitting the permit, who in turn 
respects the legitimacy of the agreement reached in the past. One of the ways 
that vendors and others attempt to render themselves moral subjects, ac-
cordingly, is by situating their own claim to legality in a particular historical 
moment which they interpret as moral, and interpreting agreements reached 
in other moments as illegal, immoral, or corrupt.
Wholesale merchants, for their part, often cite 1981 and the issuance of 
the Reglamento (internal statutes which prohibit street vending) as a date 
which precedes and obviates permits, as a time when the market was brand 
new and the administration had just promised to fortify it against informal 
commerce “like the Great Wall of China” (Berthier 1994). As Jaime Liniers, 
a lime merchant who had studied law and was one of the proponents of the 
move to the CEDA told me in an interview, “In the Merced (the old whole-
sale market in central Mexico City, which preceded the CEDA), there was a 
huge problem with ambulantes, but that is why we came here, to modernize 
commerce. Unfortunately, that opportunity was lost by our administration, 
which, as you know, is corrupt.” Ironically, even though many merchants 
come from families in which their parents or grandparents may have gotten 
their start selling fruit and vegetables on the street, today they see ambu-
lantes and the permitting system as signs of disorder, which many hope to 
eliminate by turning back to the legal guarantee of a different time, rolling 
back the multiple agreements between administration and permitted ven-
dors which have allowed for the former to persist in the market. 
Street vendors, on the other hand, tend to invoke the law as a guarantor 
of rights rather than a way to enforce rule-based order located in a distant 
past, although the extent to which they embrace this depends in part on their 
own legal status. Crispin Valencia is the leader of one of the CEDA’ recognized 
informal vendors’ unions. A short, dark skinned man from southern Mexico 
near the Guatemalan border, he has been in the CEDA for over twenty years 
and is responsible for mediating between the hundred and fifty or so people 
he has in his association, and the market administration. Each month, he 
collects 135 pesos (slightly over ten dollars) from each of his constituents, in 
exchange for which he makes sure that their permits are in order and that 
they are protected in the case of conflicts with local inspectors or other mer-
chants. Of this money, he deposits 103 pesos to the market administration’s 
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Department of Regulatory Compliance (Normatividad) bank account as a 
land use fee, keeping the remaining 32 pesos for himself.3
Like other street vendors I encountered, Crispin is well-versed in the 
language of law. All Mexican citizens, he explained to me, are guaranteed the 
right to work in the constitution, and this right cannot be prohibited in public 
spaces. “The sidewalks and parks are not theirs to privatize,” he explains, re-
ferring to the city government, “and it is illegal for them to try to push us out.” 
Permitted and unpermitted street vendors alike tend to recur to this logic of 
rights (to work, to the city) when articulating their claim to the streets, while 
they see the state’s attempts to enforce anti-vending bylaws as illegal and il-
legitimate. 
As a way to strengthen their claim of rights, Crispin and other street 
vendors work on demonstrating their deservingness, contrasting themselves 
with other, less worthy subjects. Speaking of his union membership, Crispin 
explained that eighty percent of the CEDA’s street vendors are women, and 
were it not for the possibility of selling food or trinkets on the street they 
would need to turn to prostitution or crime. Lupe and Norma, too, quickly al-
lude the specter of prostitution when discussing the paucity of options avail-
able to poor, single women. “I am doing honest work,” Norma said, “every 
day I’m here, giving it my everything, not degrading myself or others.” Street 
vendors emphasize their poverty, humility, and legality, contrasting them-
selves with criminals. “We are poor people, humble people, without the re-
sources to pay thousands of pesos a month in rent,” Crispin told me, “but we 
work hard.” In meetings with market authorities and merchants, Crispin is 
careful to perform this deserving role, always wearing a battered plaid shirt 
and baseball hat no matter the occasion, and referring to himself in the third 
person as “su servidor” (“at your service”).
It is not only vendors, however, who portray themselves as deserving, 
hard-workers. Police officers, despite being responsible for many of the most 
violent and repressive encounters with street vendors, are often quick to ex-
press their discomfort with characterizations of ambulantes as criminals, 
and defend their character. One officer, a young migrant from the state of 
Chiapas who joined the police force in order to have access to its football 
facilities and teams, used to work as a street vendor selling car accessories at 
a busy crosswalk during rush hour. Today, working in the police, he is frus-
trated by the periodic directive to “remove” vendors or confiscate their goods.
“I don’t like to do that because I know they are breaking the 
law but I know – I see, that they are here doing honest work. If 
they weren’t here selling gum, they could be selling something 
3 In 2015, the administration of the CEDA removed itself from the list of public 
agencies required to have public financial disclosure. Some merchants specu-
late that it is because of shady deals, such as the street vendors’ unions cuotas, 
that the administration chose to do this.
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else. And sometimes they [the government] tell us to leave them 
alone, sometimes they tell us to remove them, and in the end it’s 
us, the police, who end up getting into trouble.”
The police officer here, like Crispin and Norma, engages in a form of bound-
ary-work that serves to differentiate between criminals who “sell something 
else,” and the “honest work” pointing to the problem of incoherent regulation 
that conflates the two.
Nevertheless, the expansive notion of law-as-rights held by Crispin 
and other permitted vendors contracts when they are confronted with the 
question of what to do with ambulantes who are not covered by the 2005 
agreement with the administration. “Deservingness” also means differenti-
ating themselves from unlicensed vendors, through comparing themselves 
in terms of their hygienic standards, legality, or work ethic (Hayden 2014). 
Recall, for example, Lupe’s claim that the administration needs to remove 
unpermitted vendors in order to prevent overcrowding in the CEDA. Permit-
ted vendors like Lupe are often in favor of increasing regulation and codify-
ing the unwritten agreements which give them a right to work on the streets 
as a way to restrict further access to those same streets. In 2015, Crispin and 
a group of other vendor’s union leaders proposed to join forces with UNCO-
FYL in support of a “reorganization” of the market’s street commerce laws, 
which would remove a large number of unpermitted vendors from the mar-
ket. Explaining the logic behind this move, one of Crispin’s allies, Valentín, 
explained:
“It is true that many of those people are hard-working, but the 
fact is that this market does not have room for all of us, and it is 
of no use to anybody if nobody can make a living. That is why I 
support the reorganization efforts, since we need to have rules 
(normas) which are clear so that people can’t take advantage 
of them. Without rules everything gets resolved through shady 
deals (acuerdos oscuros), and it gets harder to make sure that 
there are no criminals getting involved.”
Permitted vendors thus represent the law, on the one hand, as a flexible tech-
nology which may be morally appropriated and modified in the interest of 
social justice. Yet this understanding of law as a guarantor or rights quickly 
shifts to the logic of law-and-order, as Valentín picks up on the discourse of 
street vendors as linked to criminality in his reference to acuerdos oscuros. 
For undocumented vendors, on the other hand, permits exist in the realm 
of future aspirations and negotiations still to come, and get expressed in the 
language of still unrecognized rights. Rights, in the form of permits still un-
granted, reside in a promised future, whereas order, signified by their ab-
sence in a system where ambulantes would be altogether eliminated, belongs 
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to an unfulfilled past promise. Permits thus act as a legal technology through 
which the classic tension between rights and order gets articulated through 
recourse to different temporal imaginaries, the past and present both repre-
senting a promise of stability which the present moment forecloses.
Disambiguation, then, takes multiple forms: it can take the form of per-
forming “deservingness” by dressing, speaking, and acting as behooves as 
“humble, honest worker.” It can take the form of symbolically distancing one-
self from other, more criminal figures, such as the common criminal (rata) 
or the prostitute or the undocumented vendor. Or, it can take the form of 
explaining the basis of certain legal claims using the language of rights or 
of law-and-order, and of dismissing others on the basis of corruption or il-
legitimacy.
In spite of the widespread discourse which associates street vendors with 
disorder and criminality, therefore, attention to the forms of disambiguation 
which different actors engage in reveals the potency of the counter-narrative 
in which vendors are held up as particularly honest, humble, hard-workers, 
and representative of the best side of Mexican society. The term trabajador 
– which in Spanish refers to both the noun form of “worker” as well as some-
body who is a “hard-worker” – is invoked by vendors, merchants, and even 
police to describe street vendors in positive terms, and to contrast them with 
two categories of Mexicans which are also popularly seen as sources of disor-
der: the rata, and the corrupt government. The difficulty of disambiguation, 
then, lies precisely in this slippage between categories and the question of 
legitimacy.
Contested Legitimacy
Vending permits in Mexico are a legal concession rather than a guarantee 
or pathway to substantive rights. This situates them firmly in a grey area of 
legality, and makes them prime sites for the production of ambiguous legal-
ity. As the anthropologists Susan Coutin and Sally Merry have suggested, in 
reference to a very different type of permitting – the selective issuing of “de-
ferred action” status to undocumented youth under the Obama administra-
tion – such permits substitute “administrative solutions to social problems 
and conflicts” (Coutin and Merry 2013: 4). In spite of this, permitting contin-
ues to be one of the primary legal pathways through which street vendors, in 
their daily lives, attempt to regularize their relationship with the state, and 
make a claim to legality. The form of citizenship permits confer is partial and 
incomplete, but it provides a “terrain of political possibility” (Zeiderman et 
al. 2015), both for street vendors who hope to claim their right to the city, and 
to those who oppose them and would eliminate the program.
Waiting, deferral, and “lawful presence without lawful status” (Coutin 
and Merry 2013) are spatio-temporal conditions to which the street vending 
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permit contributes, and which compel subjects to engage in a process of dis-
ambiguation in an effort to clarify the moral boundaries and their uncertain 
legal terrains. Yet it is not only the affective sensation of timelessness, out-
of-placeness, and insecurity on the part of street vendors that we can learn 
about through paying attention to the legal technology of the permit. The way 
in which these technologies are understood by those administering them and 
those opposed to them are instructive, as well, and reveal the way in which 
popular political imaginaries of corruption and legitimacy shape street vend-
ing and other forms of ambiguous legality.
Back in the CEDA, during a meeting between wholesale merchants and 
representatives from market’s Office of Regulatory Compliance (Normativi-
dad) in 2014, the subject of street vendors came up, as it does in nearly every 
meeting between the two groups. Why, asked the merchants, were the am-
bulantes still there, in clear violation of the market’s normas (by-laws)? Why 
was the office going around issuing permits instead of implementing the rule 
of law and removing the street vendors? In an attempt to explain the legal 
grey zone through which vendors are permitted – an act of disambiguation 
on the part of an authority enmeshed in the fraught terrain of ambulantaje 
– a Normatividad officer responded, “The thing is, there are two kinds of 
normas: written ones, and customs which become law.” His explanation was 
met with disbelief and anger on the part of the wholesalers.
“Very convenient,” one merchant grimly joked. “I guess now they’re go-
ing to tell us that drug trafficking isn’t really illegal because it’s a custom 
which became law.”
The joke is telling of the way in which many merchants view street vend-
ing permits: as documents illegitimately issued by authorities which, fur-
thermore, serve as evidence of the authorities’ illegitimacy. Instead of com-
municating something about the street vendors’ legality, many merchants see 
permits as instead revealing the state’s illegality. Further, when the authori-
ties try to modify the terms of permitting, either by curtailing or expand-
ing them, street vendors themselves are wont to assume this same stance, 
accusing the authorities of acting illegitimately and corruptly. As forms of 
legalizing documentation, then, permits are contingent and incomplete, pro-
ductive of social cleavages and disagreements as much as resolution to the 
persistent disputes over street vending in Mexico City. Even as some vendors 
and authorities cleave to permits and other forms of legal recognition as tools 
of disambiguation, as ways of establishing their rights and legitimate claims 
in contested terrains, these tools often serve to perpetuate conditions of legal 
ambiguity.
This situation is compounded in a context where the source of legal au-
thority itself is suspect, and the state is widely mistrusted and seen as cor-
rupt, as is the case in Mexico today (Durand Ponte 2002). Yet here I am not 
simply giving an account of the break between law and society, where the 
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former acquires the status of moral community in Durkheimian fashion, 
as Greenhouse (2012) has noted is the case in many contemporary legal an-
thropologies. Some street vendors, to be sure, may disambiguate by point-
ing to the immorality of the law, as was the case with one itinerant vendor 
in Mexico City’s Centro Histórico who told Rodrigo Meneses-Reyes that he 
“never wanted to apply for a license because, according to him, the current 
authorities are the same crooks that have always benefitted from the less 
privileged” (2013: 3). Most vendors, nevertheless, seek some form of recog-
nition, or engage in a process of disambiguation by depicting themselves as 
ethical subjects sometimes against and sometimes through the state, some-
times in solidarity with other vendors, and other times at odds with them.
The legal ambiguity of street vending is a product of a long history of 
negotiations through political and civil society, of illegal occupation and 
legal regulation, of the social and symbolic construction of the meaning of 
street commerce. The key to its persistence lies in this very ambiguity, which 
compels vendors to engage in the everyday work of maintaining and erecting 
boundaries and of strategically reinterpreting the law, which in turn is con-
stantly reinterpreting their legality. It is this work, of moral policing and find-
ing clarity in the midst of uncertainty, that comprises an important, but often 
unseen, form of everyday labor for street vendors in contemporary Mexico 
City.
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